Equality, Security and Sustainability: In Search of Virtuous Circles by Spratt, S
IDSEVIDENCE REPORTNo 219
Equality, Security and Sustainability








This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are clearly credited.
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in February 2017
© Institute of Development Studies 2017
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme 
works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing 
processes. This material has been developed under the Equality, Security and Sustainability theme.
The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not  
necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies.





 Acknowledgements 2 
 Abbreviations 3 
  
 Introduction 4 
 
1 Forms of interaction 6 
 
2 Some definitions 8 
2.1 (In)equality 8 
2.2 (In)security 9 
2.3 (Un)sustainability 10 
 
3 Sustainability–equality interactions 13 
3.1 Lose-lose interactions 13 
3.2 Win-lose interactions 16 
3.3 Win-win interactions 20 
 
4 Equality–security interactions 24 
4.1 Lose-lose interactions 24 
4.2 Win-lose interactions 26 
4.3 Win-win interactions 28 
 
5 Security–sustainability interactions 30 
5.1 Lose-lose interactions 30 
5.2 Win-lose interactions 32 
5.3 Win-win (+ win?) interactions 34 
 
6 Interaction dynamics, research questions and concluding remarks 35 
 









Table 2.1 Environmental pressures and shocks: what and for whom? 11 
Table 6.1 Sustainability–equality dynamics 35 
Table 6.2 Equality–security dynamics 36 









This report is built upon a strong foundation of previous related work at the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS). First, it owes a significant debt to three IDS Evidence Reports 
on each of the three areas considered: Accelerating Sustainability: Why Political Economy 
Matters (Schmitz and Scoones 2015); Inequality: Trends, Harms and New Agendas (Justino 
and Moore 2015); and Whose Security? Building Inclusive and Secure Societies in an 
Unequal and Insecure World (Luckham 2015). Second, these studies were augmented by 
bespoke background review papers on inequality written by Bruno Martarano (2017, 
forthcoming), sustainability by Stephen Spratt with Eilis Lawlor and Katy Joyce (2017, 
forthcoming), and security and conflict written by Stephen Spratt (2017, forthcoming). 
Thanks to Matthew Lockwood, Adrian Ely and Patricia Justino for very helpful comments on 
these papers. Finally, with respect to the interactions between the issues, the report is 
informed by an IDS foresight study: Integrating Sustainable Development: A Foresight 
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Many people and institutions are conducting research on inequality, security, or 
environmental sustainability. Some are looking at two of these issues together. None, to our 
knowledge, are examining all three simultaneously, or looking in detail at the interactions 
between them. This matters. Of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), nine relate 
directly to these subjects,1 and eight have strong indirect linkages. Crucially, while each 
SDG can be considered on its own terms, they should really be viewed as interdependent 
objectives: the level and nature of growth and industrialisation, for example, is inextricably 
linked with environment goals.   
 
The same is true of the three objectives that form the title of this report. From a development 
perspective, the aim is not to foster societies that are equal or secure or sustainable, but to 
understand the pathways that could potentially lead to societies with all of these 
characteristics. As a prerequisite, we need to identify the ways that these goals can interact 
during the development process, both negatively and positively, and understand better how 
negative interactions might be reduced and positive synergies enhanced.  
 
This is an extremely challenging task for four reasons. First, the literature on each of these 
three subjects is vast and growing all the time. Second, rather than a single ‘literature’, we 
are really talking about numerous discrete, and often non-overlapping, literatures within the 
different social science disciplines.  
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, no interaction holds in all circumstances. What was 
true in the past may not be in the future. Relationships that seem very robust in one location 
may not hold in others. To a greater or lesser extent, all interactions are thus contingent on 
particular contexts. In some cases, these contextual factors are relatively well understood. In 
others we know very little.  
 
The final challenge concerns timescales, or duration. An interaction that looks positive in the 
short run may turn out to be less so over the longer term, and vice versa. The classic 
example is the relationship between economic growth and sustainability, which its 
proponents argue is captured in the inverted U of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). 
From this perspective, the early stages of growth are associated with deteriorating 
environmental outcomes, but this negative interaction becomes positive beyond a certain 
level of national income.  
 
The validity of the EKC is fiercely contested in the literature, with supporters and opponents 
both pointing to examples that give weight to their positions. This rather underscores the 
point about contingency: in some circumstances EKC-type relationships may hold, in others 
not. This suggests that there is nothing inevitable about these relationships, in either a 
negative or a positive sense. That is, growth may lead to worsening environmental 
outcomes, but this is contingent upon the nature of growth. Similarly, environmental 
outcomes may improve beyond a certain level of income, but this is also not guaranteed. In 
the first instance, we need to understand how growth can avoid creating negative 
environmental impacts. In the latter case, we need to understand how the potentially positive 
environmental effects of more affluent countries can be realised.  
 
                                               
1 Gender equality; affordable and clean energy; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; sustainable 
consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; and peace, justice and strong institutions. 
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Given these challenges, it is important to establish some boundaries at the outset, and to be 
clear about the aims of this report. Given the scale of the literatures, it is simply not possible 
to be comprehensive. Inevitably, many relevant research findings will have been missed. 
Rather than a comprehensiveness review, therefore, the first aim of the report is to develop 
some analytically useful categories, which may help cut through the complexities of the 
interactions between these development goals. The simple typology of interactions 
introduced in Section 1 is the main contribution in this regard.  
 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 explore these interactions through a series of paired development goals: 
sustainability and equality; equality and security; and sustainability and security. In a limited 
number of areas, important interactions emerge between all three goals, which are 
considered in Section 6. As described above, no claims to comprehensiveness are made. 
Rather, some of the most important interactions – negative and positive – that are found in 
the literature are identified. In each case, a distinction is made between the dynamics of 
these potential interactions, and the contingent factors which determine whether they are 
‘catalysed’ or not. The second aim of the report is to develop these analytic categories and 
begin to populate them. 
 
Each section concludes with a series of research questions, which are summarised and 





1 Forms of interaction 
 
There are three possible types of interaction between the objectives described. First, they 
may be mutually supportive of each other, so that progress with one is associated with 
progress in the other(s). We might call these types of interactions, ‘win-win’. Second, there 
may be a trade-off between the goals, such that progress in one is associated with negative 
impacts in another. We might call these, ‘win-lose’. A third category of ‘lose-lose’ interaction 
would see negative impacts reinforce each other. 
 
As the title of the report suggests, the ultimate aim of the exercise is to contribute towards 
our understanding of how development pathways where sustainability, equality and security 
reinforce each other positively can be encouraged. Specifically, how can synergies be 
enhanced and the debate be moved onto a more positive footing? There are two stages to 
this.  
 
First, we need to identify the most important interactions in what might be called business-
as-usual (BAU) scenarios. In what ways are outcomes in each of the three areas related? 
How, and under what conditions, can inequalities undermine security, or sustainable 
environmental behaviour, for example? Conversely, how and under what conditions, does 
greater equality undermine conflict or unsustainable environmental outcomes? As well as 
the dynamics of these relationships, the role that context plays in shaping these dynamics is 
a principle concern.  
 
The reason why it is important to understand these dynamics and contingencies is so that 
they can be positively influenced. As well as BAU, therefore, the second stage is to examine 
interactions during interventions designed to achieve positive outcomes in one or more area. 
In what ways, and under what conditions, for example, can interventions to enhance 
sustainability affect inequality? How can negative impacts be avoided and positive synergies 
be enhanced? Similarly, how might interventions to avoid or resolve conflict affect 
inequalities of different forms, and how can these interventions be designed to have positive 
impacts? 
 
This simple typology is used to organise the material in each of the following sections. There 
are many different ways this could be done, and the approach taken here is just one of 
these. What is important, however, is to use some framework to organise and analyse the 
relevant material. An advantage of the approach taken here is its simplicity. In reality, there 
are many more than three possible interactions, not least in terms of differing intensity – 
‘lose-lose’ interaction may be relatively mild or potentially catastrophic. Rather than build this 
into the framework, adding to the complexity, this issue is addressed through the 
prioritisation of research questions on the basis of their importance.  
 
A second decision that has been taken in the service of simplicity, is to keep questions of 
definition separate from this framework. In each of the three areas, ‘sustainability’, ‘equality’ 
and ‘security’ can mean very different things. This is partly different aspects of the issue 
concerned – climate change versus natural resource use, or inequality of income or status, 
for example. ‘Sustainability’ is particularly multifaceted in this regard. A second point of 
difference, however, is more fundamental. What level of resource use or carbon emissions is 
sustainable, for example, or what do we mean by ‘security’ in a particular context? For the 
framework to be analytically manageable, these questions are examined separately in 




Finally, while some schools of thought are discipline-specific, there are important cross-
disciplinary perspectives at play. These broad ‘narratives’ shape the analysis of both 
problems and solutions. Drawing on the literature on sustainability transitions, Schmitz and 




3. State-led; and 
4. Citizen-led. 
 
Proponents of market-led transformations, for example, tend to diagnose the problem as the 
lack of such instruments – environmental assets are not priced, or not priced accurately, for 
example. The solutions that naturally follow are thus very likely to be market-led.  
 
While it is likely that workable ‘solutions’ could be found in each of these narrative areas, the 
consequences – in terms of the interactions we are concerned with here – may be quite 
different. Depending on the detail of their design, for example, some market mechanisms to 
address sustainability issues could have negative implications for inequality, for example. 
When considering the merits of different narrative-led solutions, it is therefore important to 
think through these implications. This question of narratives is addressed at relevant points 
in the following sections, most significantly in Section 6 where research questions are 




2 Some definitions 
 
Equality, security and sustainability have a number of different aspects, and also mean 
different things to different people. Before examining interactions between these objectives, 
therefore, we first need to unpack this a little. One way of thinking about this is to distinguish 
between questions of ‘what’ and ‘for whom’.  
2.1 (In)equality 
Inequality is concerned with the distribution of something. This often refers to income or 
wealth, but can also be applied to political matters (such as rights) or social phenomena 
(such as status). The 2016 World Social Science Report (WSSR) identifies seven types of 
inequality: 
 
1. Economic inequality – e.g. wealth and income; 
2. Social inequality – e.g. education, health or justice; 
3. Cultural inequality – e.g. discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, race or religion; 
4. Political inequality – e.g. ability to influence decisions or participate in political 
activities;  
5. Spatial inequality – e.g. disparities between urban and rural areas; 
6. Environmental inequality – e.g. access to natural resources or exposure to pollution; 
and 
7. Knowledge-based inequality – e.g. ability to access and/or contribute to knowledge 
(ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016). 
 
These differences highlight an important distinction; for example, some measures of 
inequality, such as income or wealth, concern outcomes, while others, such as access to 
education, relate to opportunities. In terms of the ‘what’, therefore, we can first distinguish 
between inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. In practice, these two concepts 
are often, though not always, related: unequal access to education is likely to result in 
unequal outcomes with respect to income, for example, while unequal income may also 
influence access to high-quality education. Whether or not unequal outcomes lead to 
unequal opportunities is relevant for the questions motivating this report. Reducing 
inequalities from current levels is not possible unless this link can be broken, as existing 
inequalities would simply be reproduced, and possibly exacerbated. Understanding the 
dynamics of these relationships, and how they can be influenced, is therefore important. 
 
If the ‘what’ question refers to outcomes and opportunities – material and non-material – the 
‘for whom’ question focuses on the nature of the distribution. In this regard, two main types 
of inequality are differentiated by their unit of analysis. While vertical inequality is concerned 
with the individual or household,2 research into horizontal inequality looks at how the 
different types of inequality (outcomes and opportunities; material and non-material) are 
distributed between groups. These may be organised along ethnic lines, or by gender or 
religion.  Stewart and Langer define and distinguish the approach as follows: 
 
Horizontal Inequality (HI) is defined as inequality among culturally defined (or 
constructed) groups, in contrast to Vertical Inequality (VI) which is inequality among 
households or individuals. HIs are multidimensional, including a political and social 
                                               
2 Generally applied to income or wealth, measures of vertical inequality such as the Gini coefficient capture how equally 
distributed these assets are amongst the population. A country where all the income (or wealth) was held by a single individual 
would have a Gini coefficient of one. A situation of full equality would be zero. While most commonly used to measure the 




dimension, as well as economic, and a range of elements in each of these 
dimensions. 
(Stewart and Langer 2008: 1) 
 
Horizontal inequalities may thus cut across the seven dimensions identified in the WSSR, 
though are most directly relevant for cultural inequalities.   
 
While acknowledging the importance of non-material forms of inequality, the majority of the 
material presented below focuses on income or wealth, reflecting the weight of this kind of 
research in the literature. Although the other dimensions of inequality will be considered to 
some extent, more attention is paid to economic forms. As discussed in detail in the WSSR 
(op. cit.), however, many of these forms of inequality are mutually reinforcing, such that 
many of the most important issues for income and wealth are also very relevant for the other 
dimensions of inequality.  
2.2 (In)security  
 
To ravage, to slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire; and where they 
make a desert, they call it peace.  
(The Agricola by Tacitus, AD98) 
 
Security means different things to different people. The quote above is from the Roman 
historian, Tacitus, but Tacitus is actually quoting the Celtic chieftain, Calcagus. From the 
perspective of Rome and its supporters, the Empire brought stability and peace: the Pax 
Romana. For their opponents and defeated enemies, however, things would no doubt have 
looked rather different.  
 
What do the questions of what, and for whom look like with respect to security? ‘Security’ 
may mean the absence of war, conflict or violence, but may also refer to the suppression of 
social movements. Depending on one’s perspective, therefore, it may be either a negative or 
a positive phenomenon. Similarly, we may be talking about the cessation of conflict between 
professional armies, or the absence of guerrilla warfare, terrorism or popular protests. In 
each case, there will be different protagonists involved, or affected as ‘collateral damage’, 
and people will disagree on the appropriate nomenclature – one person’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter.  
 
Luckham and Kirk propose another way of addressing the ‘for whom’ question, 
distinguishing between ‘suppliers’ of security, including but not restricted to states, and those 
who are the intended beneficiaries of a conflict-free environment. The authors term the latter 
form ‘security in the vernacular’, to capture the fact that this is security as viewed through its 
‘end users’: 
 
According to the first (or supply side) view: security is the creation and maintenance 
of authoritative social orders including, but not confined to, those we term states. 
According to the second (or demand side) view: security is a basic entitlement of 
those who are supposed to be protected by these social orders.  
(Luckham and Kirk 2013: 339) 
 
Returning to the ‘what’, Brown and Stewart (2015) identify four forms of conflict which have 
characterised recent decades and contrast these with large-scale conflicts between nation 
states, which culminated in the world wars of the twentieth century. First, wars by proxy are 
where ‘great powers’ fight indirectly, supporting opposing sides in a conflict, providing 
‘advisors’, arms and other resources to the different sides. Second, external interventions in 
domestic conflicts have been particularly associated with the West in recent decades. 
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Examples include Kosovo, Afghanistan, or the wars in Iraq. Third, revolutionary or 
ideological wars include those fought against colonial rule, as well as those to overthrow 
existing political orders, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the early stages of the 
Colombian conflict, the Shining Path in Peru, and Maoist factions in Nepal. Rebellions aimed 
at installing democracy or imposing a particular ideology such as Sharia law are also 
examples. The final category identified is wars fought for political control by ethnic or 
religious groups, or coalitions of groups, and include conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Northern 
Ireland, Uganda and most recently, the Middle East.  
 
Historically, these types of conflict have generally been contained within nation states, 
though often involving actors from other jurisdictions. An exception, which has become 
increasingly important in recent times is international terrorism, which may be motivated by 
religious or ideological factors. 
 
As well as conflicts of these kinds, ‘insecurity’ can also be defined broadly to include jobs 
and livelihoods. Whilst acknowledging the importance of these issues for the process of 
development, this report focuses primarily on issues of physical rather than economic 
security. Insecurity, therefore, is defined as the lack of physical security, or the risk of 
physical harm. As to the ‘for whom’ question, we are interested in security from the 
perspective of citizens rather than states – i.e. ‘security in the vernacular’ in the language of 
Luckham and Kirk (2013) and Luckham (2015). 
2.3 (Un)sustainability 
Of the three objectives considered, environmental sustainability – or its absence – is the 
most multifaceted and complex. For reasons of space, therefore, questions of ‘what’ and ‘for 
whom’ are unpacked and summarised in Table 2.1. The ‘what’ in this case is some form of 
environmental pressure or shock. These are divided into two columns to differentiate 
ultimate causes (e.g. climate change) from proximate impacts (e.g. temperature increases, 
volatile weather and rising sea levels).  
 
The next column addresses the ‘for whom’ question, distinguishing between households, 
social groups, businesses and nation states.3 The environmental pressures and shocks 
described will have different impacts on these actors, mostly negative but in some cases 
positive.4 As well as the direct examples given, we would also expect to see indirect effects. 
Reduced crop yields resulting from rising temperatures, for example, would reduce the 
incomes of farming households directly, and could also increase malnutrition rates. This 
could have wider (indirect) impacts on food prices, and also on productivity and growth 
because of the impact of lower incomes and productivity. Another ‘indirect’ impact is that on 
future generations. While not included directly, this issue is inherent to all aspects of the 
sustainability debate.  
 
Given the breadth and complexity of questions of environmental sustainability, it is neither 
feasible nor desirable to give a focused definition. This is compounded by the fact that there 
is no consensus on what ‘sustainable’ actually means. In 1987 the Brundtland Commission 
defined ‘sustainable’ development as that which ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). While 
this well-known definition has been adopted by most international agencies (Schneider 
2008), it has never really satisfied either extremes of the debate, which we might crudely 
term the economist versus ecologist positions – the views of most actual economists or 
ecologists would be somewhere between these extremes, which are presented in stylised 
form to illustrate the main points of difference.  
                                               
3 An ‘actor’ not included here is the planet itself, or ‘Gaia’ to use James Lovelock’s terminology. Whilst acknowledging this 
important ethical position, the approach taken in this report is anthropocentric.  
4 Negative environmental impacts create opportunities for some businesses, for example.  
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For our stylised ecologists, the principal problem with the definition is that ‘needs’ could be 
defined to include luxury items, leading to consumption that is unnecessary as well as 
unsustainable. A second, more ‘deep green’ objection, is that the definition is too 
anthropocentric, ignoring the ‘needs’ of other species (Goffman 2005; Lélé 1991; Montani 
2007). Some economists would argue, again depending on how key terms are defined, that 
the definition risks trapping the poor in a cycle of impoverishment, as it may preclude levels 
and forms of growth today necessary to escape these (Beckerman 1992, 1994; Bernstam 
1990; Pezzey 1997).  
Table 2.1 Environmental pressures and shocks: what and for whom? 







Household Crop yield; food security; income; 
malnutrition; migration 
Social groups Livelihoods; migration 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Tax; FX 
Volatile weather 
patterns 
Household Crop yield; food security; income; 
malnutrition; floods; storm damage; 
migration 
Social groups Livelihoods; migration 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations FX; tax; infrastructure 
Rising sea levels Household Housing; livelihoods; migration 
Social groups Communities’ livelihoods; migration 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Infrastructure; housing; security 
Declining fish 
stocks 
Household Food security; malnutrition 
Social groups Food security; income 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Tax; FX 
Biodiversity Declining 
biodiversity 
Household Income; health; leisure; wellbeing 
Social groups Livelihoods; culture 
Businesses Offsets 
Nations ODA; tourism 
Resource use Unsustainable 
renewable 
resource use (e.g. 
deforestation, 
overfishing)  
Household Income; livelihoods; migration 
Social groups Land rights; culture; income 
Businesses Revenues; jobs 
Nations CO2 emissions; biodiversity; tourism; 
tax revenue; FX; security  
Unsustainable non-
renewable 
resource use (e.g. 
fossil-fuels, 
minerals, metals) 
Household Income; livelihoods; migration 
Social groups Land rights; culture; income 
Businesses Revenues; jobs 
Nations CO2 emissions; biodiversity; tourism; 
tax revenue; FX; security  
Localised 
pollution/supply 
Air Household Health 
Social groups Local health 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Health costs; tourism 
Water (quality + 
supply) 
Household Health; costs 
Social groups Health; costs 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Health expenditure; security  
Soil Household Crop yield; food security; income; health 
Social groups Livelihoods 
Businesses Revenues; costs; jobs 
Nations Tax revenues; FX 
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An alternative paradigm is weak sustainability, sometimes called the ‘economics definition’. 
Weak sustainability draws on the work of welfare economists (most notably Solow (1974) 
and Hartwick (1977)) and assumes that human-made capital can often be substituted for 
natural capital, and under certain conditions should be. Specifically, if the value generated by 
transforming natural capital into human-made capital is greater than that from leaving natural 
capital intact, the transformation should take place (Beckerman 1994; Solow 1993). To not 
do so is inefficient and even morally objectionable.  
 
Proponents of ‘strong sustainability’ take a different view, disputing the substitutability of 
natural and human-made capital for a number of reasons. First, different elements of natural 
capital exist as part of complex ecosystems and we do not understand the system-level 
consequences of depleting individual elements. Second, unlike human-made capital, the 
loss of species is irreversible. Third, as human-made capital relies on natural capital to exist, 
it can only be a complement not a substitute. Finally, certain forms of natural capital are 
viewed as essential for human survival – so called ‘critical capital’ – and cannot be replaced 
by human-made capital (Pelenc and Ballet 2015). 
 
When we think about how ‘sustainability’ could interact with the other areas, therefore, we 
need to consider how this is affected by the definition of sustainability being used. 
Disagreement over definitions and ramifications will shape perspectives on the existence 
and nature of the interactions described above, both in terms of ‘business as usual’ and the 
design and implementation of policy interventions. For these reasons, no attempt is made at 
a single definition in this case. Rather, the roles that these different definitions can play are 
explored throughout the report.  
 
Having introduced a simple typology of interactions, and discussed how our three 
development goals can be defined, Sections 3, 4 and 5 examine some key findings from the 
literature on the interactions between these goals. As discussed above, the goal is to further 
understanding on how negative interactions can be avoided and positive synergies 
encouraged. Accordingly, each pair of development goals examines three forms of 




3 Sustainability–equality interactions 
 
Research on the interactions between inequality and environmental sustainability is a rapidly 
evolving field. This is partly because interest in how inequalities can be reduced has only 
recently moved to the top of the research agenda. Another factor is that the timeframes with 
some environmental issues are very long, complicating questions of causal relationships. 
While we can already see clear evidence in some parts of the world, the most severe 
projected impacts of climate change will be felt in the future, potentially the distant future 
depending on one’s view. Inevitably, therefore, research on how these long-term effects 
could interact with inequality (or security) is somewhat speculative. This is not to question its 
importance, however. As we shall see, some of these interactions have profound 
implications. Waiting to act until they have fully transpired could be catastrophic. 
3.1 Lose-lose interactions 
In some cases, ‘lose-lose’ interactions can be observed as part of business as usual. Here 
the task is to understand the dynamics of these relationships, and the contingencies that 
shape them – when does a ‘lose’ in one area create or exacerbate one in another, what 
contingent factors determine this, and how might they be avoided? At face value, we would 
not expect to find such interactions resulting from interventions to improve outcomes with 
respect to either sustainability or inequality. By definition, these are trying to produce at least 
one ‘win’. Having said that, it is not difficult to imagine – or to find examples – of well-
intentioned interventions that have spectacularly failed to achieve this, and have made 
matters worse. Sometimes this may be the result of incompetence. In other cases it may be 
the result of the application of flawed and fiercely contested approaches.  
 
This is a particular issue with questions of ‘sustainability’. ‘Green grabbing’, for example, is 
where land in developing countries is acquired by groups of companies and investors for 
ostensibly ‘green’ reasons, but which result in negative environmental and inequality 
outcomes. The latter may result from dispossessing local people of traditional lands and their 
associated livelihoods, many of which are environmentally positive. The former may result 
from environmentally damaging land-use change as more intensive farming methods are 
used, or where ‘green’ crops such as biofuels are grown, or where the aim is to obtain 
international climate finance (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012).  
 
As well as understanding how ‘lose-lose’ interactions can be avoided in terms of business as 
usual, therefore, it is also essential to do the same for interventions. Ideally perhaps, these 
types of intervention would be avoided entirely. If this is not feasible, however, we need to 
understand the contingent factors that lead to the negative outcomes so that they can be 
successfully mitigated. 
 
Returning to BAU scenarios, the impacts of climate change are, and will continue to be, 
unevenly distributed around the world. Rising temperatures are felt more acutely in 
equatorial regions, affecting agricultural yields and rates of desertification. Increasingly 
volatile weather patterns are more likely to affect tropical regions (IPCC 2014). At the same 
time, vulnerability to these impacts will tend be higher in poorer countries, where 
infrastructure may be lacking or not resilient to climate change, and households have fewer 






Figure 3.1 National vulnerability to climate change impacts  
 
Source: Adapted from ND-GAIN (http://index.gain.org/). 
 
This is illustrated in the map (Figure 3.1) from the ND-GAIN research programme at the 
University of Notre Dame, which combines physical impacts of climate change with capacity 
to adapt to these effects, creating a global index of national vulnerability. As we can see, the 
highest levels of vulnerability are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, South, Southeast and 
Central Asia. As well as these national-level differences, we would expect to see similarly 
uneven intra-country distributions. Again, this is partly the result of physical proximity to arid 
regions, or threatened coastal areas, and partly due to different socioeconomic capacities to 
adapt to these effects (IPCC 2014). At both the national and sub-national level, therefore, 
climate change impacts are likely to exacerbate existing vertical and horizontal inequalities 
(Dennig et al. 2015).  
 
We also find negative interactions in the other direction, with existing economic inequalities 
being reproduced in environmental outcomes. From a world-systems perspective, for 
example, unequal patterns of global production and accumulation are important drivers of 
environmental change (Bergensen and Parisi 1997). Within this framework, adverse 
environmental impacts may be greatest in nations that are in the periphery of the world 
economy, as a result of economic activities to serve countries at the core (Frey 1998; Bunker 
1984, 1985).  
 
Within countries there is also evidence that environmentally damaging activity is more likely 
to be located in relatively poor areas, creating negative health effects, which perpetuate 
inequalities. Localised environmental quality is an important channel through which income 
inequalities affect population health. These results hold for air-pollution indicators (CO2 and 
SO2) and water pollution, and for rich and developing countries (Drabo 2011). 
 
Again, we find interactions in both directions, with a growing body of literature linking intra-
country inequality with negative environmental outcomes, particularly in higher-income 
countries. Rich countries with higher inequality, for example, have been found to consume 
more resources and generate more waste per person (Dorling 2010, 2011; Dorling, Barford 
and Wheeler 2007).  
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A number of channels have been identified to explain these effects. From a behavioural 
perspective, inequality has been linked with (over)consumption triggered by ‘status anxiety’. 
People have a natural tendency to strive for status (Lindenberg 2001; Schwartz 1992), and 
their concerns about relative position in social hierarchies have been linked to stress and 
health problems, particularly mental illness (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Of particular 
relevance is that status anxiety has also been linked to higher levels of consumption (Frank 
1999; Levine, Frank and Dijk 2010).  
 
A second channel, which is relevant for countries of all incomes, is political. Unequal political 
and civic rights have been associated with negative environmental outcomes, with some 
evidence that democratic governments are more environmentally concerned (Congleton 
1992; Li and Reuveny 2006; Farzin and Bond 2009). The presence of stable democracies 
has also been linked to more sustainable land-use. Rates of deforestation, for example, may 
be higher under unpredictable authoritarian governments encouraging short-term, extractive 
attitudes (Deacon 1994; Didia 1997). Political instability may also increase unsustainable 
deforestation for similar reasons (Barbier and Burgess 2001). ‘Stability’ can also be a feature 
of authoritarian regimes, however. Smith et al. (2003) find that the rate of deforestation 
increased after the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, and argue that this was 
because rent-seeking was no longer centralised and strictly controlled.  
 
Horizontal inequalities between genders may influence policy towards the environment. 
Women have been found to have more environmentally positive attitudes (Bord and 
O’Connor 1997), be less materialistic (Beutel and Marini 1995) and be less willing to engage 
in unethical behaviour (Betz, O’Connell and Shepard 1989). Stern, Peters et al. (2006) 
suggest that increasing the voice of women in policymaking is likely to be environmentally 
positive, and Agrawal (2005) confirms this empirically, finding more involvement of women in 
forest management improves outcomes.  
 
A number of important negative interactions can therefore be identified with respect to 
equality and environmental sustainability: 
 
 Some interventions (e.g. ‘green grabs’) can negatively impact local communities 
(worsening horizontal inequalities) and also have negative environmental effects. 
 Climate change impacts of all kinds may exacerbate existing inequalities, both 
between and within countries.  
 Activities with negative environmental impacts are often located in areas already 
affected by other inequalities, both between and within countries.   
 Countries with high vertical inequality (both economically and politically) are less 
likely to have environmentally positive policies.  
 Gender inequality is associated with less environmentally positive policies and 
outcomes. 
 
As described above, there is nothing certain about these relationships. Rather, what is 
described here are underlying dynamics that can create ‘lose-lose’ interactions, but where 
these outcomes are contingent on the presence – or absence – of certain contextual factors. 
What factors cause particular climate change impacts to worsen economic inequalities in a 
specific location, for example?  Most importantly for the purposes of this research, how can 
these factors be mitigated or removed altogether? Section 6 on research questions returns 






3.2 Win-lose interactions  
In this section we consider ‘win-lose’ interactions, where there is a potential trade-off 
between positive and negative outcomes with respect to equality and sustainability. As 
above, a distinction is made between the underlying dynamics of these contingent 
relationships, and the contextual factors needed to trigger them. The ultimate aim, again, is 
to begin to understand which of these factors may be most important, with the ultimate goal 
of mitigating or eliminating their effects.  
 
Globally, eliminating income inequality such that everyone enjoys the level of affluence of 
today’s rich countries may be incompatible with addressing climate change, and with the 
sustainable use of renewable and non-renewable resources. For example, Jackson (2011) 
finds that achieving this for nine billion people by the end of the century would require the 
global economy to be 40 times bigger than today. To be compatible with a sustainable level 
of emissions, the carbon intensity of growth5 would need to be 55 times less than today by 
2050. If addressing global inequality was combined with income growth of 2 per cent per 
year, the carbon intensity of growth would need to fall 130-fold from its current level. While 
still immensely challenging, achieving the necessary reduction in emissions without 
addressing inequality is a less daunting task. Assuming existing levels of inequality and 
trend income growth, this would require a 21-fold reduction in emissions (ibid.).  
 
Empirically, Ravallion, Heil and Jalan (2000) find that high inequality (between and within 
countries) is associated with lower carbon emissions, suggesting a trade-off between efforts 
to reduce inequality and address climate change. How inequalities are reduced is important 
here. Doing so by reducing the incomes/wealth of those at the top of the distribution, for 
example, will have little effect on consumption levels and thus would not be expected to 
increase emissions. On the other hand, reducing inequality by increasing the incomes of 
these at the bottom of the income distribution (with little or no disposable income) would be 
likely to influence consumption patterns. As a result of these dynamics, the carbon intensity 
of consumption could rise, increasing total emissions (ibid.).  
 
Addressing the same question more recently, Grunewald et al. (2011) find the existence of a 
U‐shaped relationship between per capita emissions and inequality, with the relationship 
mediated by the level of income. The authors agree with Ravallion et al. (op. cit.) that 
reducing inequality in poor countries is likely to increase emissions, as the very poor live 
largely outside the carbon economy. Increasing their incomes would therefore be very likely 
to increase the carbon content of their consumption. They go on to argue, however, that 
Ravallion et al. take insufficient account of differences between countries.  
 
Using a more comprehensive and recent dataset, as well as more sophisticated econometric 
techniques, Grunewald et al. (op. cit.) find a positive association between inequality and 
carbon emissions in high- and upper-middle-income countries, suggesting that reducing 
inequality would be likely to lower emissions in these countries. The result reflects the fact 
that national emissions are strongly influenced by environmental policy, and that highly 
unequal countries are less likely to have the social consensus needed to support these. 
 
These types of ‘win-lose’ interactions are not restricted to carbon emissions, but are also 
relevant for the use of other natural resources. There is no reason that the Ravallion et al. 
(op. cit.) findings could not be extended to other renewable and non-renewable resources. 
Raising the incomes of those at the bottom of income distributions in low-income countries 
could increase the carbon intensity of consumption. The same logic suggests that it would 
also increase the resource-intensity of consumption, as people can afford to buy more 
                                               
5 The carbon intensity of growth is the amount of additional carbon dioxide (CO2) generated by each additional unit of output. In 
2007, for example, this was 768g/CO2 per $. To be compatible with nine billion people reaching the level of affluence of EU 
countries this would need to fall to 14g/CO2 per $ by 2100 (Jackson op. cit.). 
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material goods. There is little current research on this topic, which has strong links to the 
growing interest in the ‘circular economy’ and the development trajectories of low- and 
middle-income countries (Gower and Schroeder 2016).6  
 
Most of the literature on the relationship between natural resources and inequality focuses 
on non-renewable resources, particularly oil, but also metals and minerals. Ross, Lujala and 
Rustad describe how the discovery of resource wealth can affect horizontal inequality, 
positively or negatively:  
 
If the producing region is poor, resource wealth can help to close any gaps between 
that region and the rest of the country; if it is relatively rich, resource wealth can 
widen gaps. If extraction facilities operate as enclaves and the regional government 
has no taxing authority, then a booming resource sector may have little or no impact 
on regional living standards. But if the extractive sector is strongly connected to the 
local economy or if the local government can tax resource revenues (either directly or 
indirectly), resource wealth can sharply boost regional employment and wages and 
increase local revenues. 
(Ross et al. 2012: 2) 
 
While these effects are well known and studied for high-value resources like oil, this has 
been less the case for relatively low-value renewable resources like forests. In principle, the 
introduction of programmes such as the UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (UN-REDD, known collectively as REDD+), which creates and transfers a 
financial value for the carbon held in standing forests, has the potential to change this. As 
with high-value resources, the impact on inequality will depend on whether relatively poor 
groups benefit more than the relatively wealthy, or vice versa.  
 
The distribution of REDD+ finance depends on how rights to forest land – or the carbon 
stocks they contain – are allocated. In many countries, indigenous and forest communities 
hold ‘traditional’ rather than formal rights over forest areas, which are often unquestioned 
because of the low economic value of forests. As REDD+ programmes create a new income 
stream for forest ‘owners’, however, incentives may be created to override traditional rights, 
either taking forests under state control, or granting exclusive use rights to private operators 
(Stevens et al. 2014). As well as preventing forest communities from accessing new forms of 
finance, this negatively affects their livelihoods, exacerbating horizontal inequalities (Spratt, 
forthcoming).  
 
Recent evidence suggests that, even when local communities do benefit, REDD+ 
programmes may exacerbate existing inequalities. Rather than reaching the most 
disadvantaged, benefits were more likely to be captured by ‘households with more socio-
political power locally, those with greater food security, and those that are more accessible… 
while many people likely to be negatively impacted by the REDD+ project did not receive 
compensation’ (Poudyal et al. 2016: 35). 
  
Thus far the assumption has been that REDD+ programmes will have a positive 
environmental effect, even if they exacerbate inequalities. This is not necessarily the case, 
however. Excluding forest communities from REDD-type programmes may also have 
negative environmental consequences. There is a growing body of evidence that these 
communities are often the best stewards of forests. Deforestation rates in the Amazon, for 
example, are positively correlated with forest management by indigenous peoples (Stevens 
et al. 2014). Interventions that fail to take account of this risk turning ‘win-lose’ interventions 
into ‘lose-lose’.  
                                               
6 The circular economy is one where waste is minimised, recycling maximised, and the outputs of some economic processes 
become the inputs of others. As a result, the resources needed to support a given level of material living standard will be less 
than would otherwise be the case. This is a very new field, particularly with respect to international development, therefore how 
much less remains an open question.  
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REDD+ is not the only sustainability intervention that has implications for inequality. 
Interventions that are designed to influence incentives do so through offering payment 
incentives (‘carrots’), or imposing costs (‘sticks’). The way these are distributed has clear 
implications for inequality.  
 
Carbon trading schemes, for example, affect inequality in two ways. The first is through their 
direct impacts on relative prices. Here effects tend to be regressive, as they raise the relative 
price of goods such as energy and fuel, which comprise a larger share of the incomes of the 
relatively poor than the relatively wealthy. Secondly, such schemes entail the transfer of 
financial resources between different parties. The level of these transfers – and who 
receives them – depends on the way that emission permits are allocated. The net inequality 
is thus determined by both the level of the ‘cap’, and the way that emission permits are 
allocated within this. The lower the cap, the greater the direct impact on relative prices. The 
more that the allocation of permits diverges from the existing pattern of emissions, the 
greater the transfers between different actors (Spratt 2012).  
 
At one extreme, ‘grandfathering’ sees permits allocated on the basis of current emissions. If 
allocated nationally, this could lock in existing levels of inequality between countries. At the 
other end of the spectrum, equal per capita emission rights would mean richer countries 
having to buy permits from poorer countries, generating large financial transfers, and 
reducing – and in principle ultimately eliminating – inter-country inequality.7 Intra-country 
trading schemes operate according to the same dynamics. The net impact of such schemes 
on inequality thus depends on the relative strength of these effects and the extent to which 
either is mitigated (ibid.). 
 
The most high-profile example we have is the European Trading System (ETS). There is 
consensus that the ETS has been very unsuccessful, and this can partly be explained by 
mistakes made with respect to the two issues described. First, the overall cap was set too 
high and second, the permits allocated to industry were too generous. Industry lobbying was 
an important driver of these outcomes, which served to put downward pressure on carbon 
prices due to excess supply of permits. Economic downturns in Europe exacerbated these 
problems, leading to persistent low carbon prices that were unable to achieve a meaningful 
impact on incentives (Grubb 2014).  
 
To the extent that trading schemes are negative for inequality – which depends on the 
details of their design – and fail to achieve their environmental objectives, they are not so 
much ‘win-lose’ as ‘draw-lose’, with no positive impact on one side, but a negative impact is 
felt on the other. While preferable to a ‘lose-lose’ interaction, this is also worse than would 
have been the case with no intervention at all.  
 
The general assumption has long been that pollution taxes are regressive, as they increase 
the relative prices of goods that form a larger part of the income basket of the relatively poor 
than the relatively wealthy.8 These disposable income effects are not the only relevant 
factors, however, as taxes also affect production and employment patterns, encouraging 
growth in some industries (in some locations) and discouraging others. Also, the proceeds 
may be used to reduce other taxes, or partly redistributed to poorer groups. The net effect on 
inequality will thus be a combination of all these factors (Oueslati et al. 2016).  
 
Examining these issues in OECD countries, Oueslati et al. (op. cit.) find no general 
relationship that holds in all circumstances. If some of the proceeds are not redistributed, the 
                                               
7 Some would go further, arguing that equal per capita emission rights does not take account of historical emissions, and that a 
fairer allocation would be to allocate total, cumulative emission rights equally. This would result in people in many high-income 
countries having negative emission rights today.  
8 For a UK-based discussion of these issues, see the work of the now disbanded Green Fiscal Commission 
(www.greenfiscalcommission.org.uk/). For a review focused on developing countries, see Spratt (2012). 
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expected regressive impact of energy taxes is found, though the effect is not large. Where 
these taxes are used to reduce those on income or labour, the impact is progressive, while 
the general impact of waste and air pollution taxes is also found to be progressive. No 
relationship is found between transport taxes and inequality. While it is certainly the case 
that environmental taxes can increase inequalities, therefore, it also seems to be true that 
this is not inevitable and can be strongly influenced by policy.  
 
A related example is fossil-fuel subsidies, which are designed – in theory – to reduce 
inequalities by lowering the costs of fuel, but create environmentally negative impacts – a 
‘lose-win’ intervention. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated these 
subsidies at US$5.4tn per year, or more than total global expenditure on health (Coady et al. 
2015). As with taxation, however, the net effect on inequality of these subsidies – and thus 
their removal – is not uniform, and is determined by the extent to which the relatively wealthy 
are able to capture the fuel subsidies. While proposed reforms are projected to increase 
inequality in Nigeria (Rentschler 2015) and Malaysia (Solaymani 2016), the outcome in 
Indonesia – where subsidies have absorbed up to 20 per cent of the total government 
budget – are far less certain (ADB 2015).  
 
The IMF estimated in 2010 that, on average, the net effects of subsidy reform programmes 
on inequality would be neutral: 
 
On average, the burden of subsidy reform is neutrally distributed across income 
groups; a US$0.25 decrease in the per liter subsidy results in a 6 per cent decrease 
in income for all groups. More than half of this impact arises from the indirect impact 
on prices of other goods and services consumed by households. Fuel subsidies are a 
costly approach to protecting the poor due to substantial benefit leakage to higher 
income groups. In absolute terms, the top income quintile captures six times more in 
subsidies than the bottom. 
(del Granado, Coady and Gillingham 2012: 1) 
 
As described here, while such subsidies may increase disposable incomes (by lowering the 
price of fuel) there is little impact on inequality as the poor do not benefit more than the 
relatively wealthy. This suggests that, on average at least, such programmes are not so 
much ‘lose-win’ as ‘lose-draw’ from an environment–equality perspective. Removing fossil-
fuel subsidies such that inequality is reduced – by targeting the proceeds on poorer groups – 
is thus a clear example of a potential ‘win-win’ intervention.  
 
A number of important ‘win-lose’ interactions have been identified: 
 
 Eliminating global income inequality by increasing the minimum income level to that 
of today’s high-income countries may be incompatible with a sustainable level of 
global carbon emissions. 
 Reducing inequality in low- and lower-middle-income countries by increasing the 
incomes of the poor is likely to increase national carbon emissions (though this may 
not apply for upper-middle- and high-income countries). 
 The same effects may be found with natural resource consumption (though it is not 
clear how this relationship would be affected by countries’ income level). 
 The discovery of natural resource wealth (or creation of new income streams 
associated with natural resources) may exacerbate existing inequalities. 
 The use of market-based instruments, such as trading schemes, to achieve 
environmental goals may exacerbate inequalities. 




As in Section 3.1, we have also seen that these dynamic relationships are not inevitable, but 
depend on the presence or absence of certain contextual factors. The negative interaction 
between carbon emissions and increasing the income of people in lower-income countries, 
for example, is ‘catalysed’ through growth in the carbon intensity of their consumption. The 
key research questions, therefore, concern whether this link can be broken, or at least 
mitigated significantly.  
 
Whether natural resource wealth (or new revenue streams associated with national resource 
wealth) increase or reduce inequality depends on whether the benefits go to the relatively 
wealthy or relatively poor, which is largely a matter of policy. Similarly, emission trading 
schemes or a rise in environmental taxes may increase inequalities, but could also have the 
opposite effect. The catalytic factors in this case are to be found in the design of these 
schemes, particularly the way that benefits and costs are distributed between groups. Again, 
this is largely a matter of policy. 
3.3 Win-win interactions  
As we have seen, the distinction between ‘win-lose’ and ‘win-win’ interactions – and all 
potential outcomes in between – is rarely clear-cut. Interventions to promote sustainability 
can have neutral, negative or positive impacts upon inequality, for example, depending on 
how they are designed and implemented. As well as specific policy interventions, we also 
see potential sustainability–equality interactions resulting from broad economic processes. 
The most important of these processes is growth, and the key question is whether growth 
can be both ‘green’ and ‘inclusive’.9  
 
Depending on one’s perspective, growth is either the main cause of environmental problems, 
or the only solution. The former position views the ‘decoupling’ of carbon emissions and 
economic activity described in Section 3.2 as impossible, with the inevitable conclusion that 
ending the fixation with economic growth – or implementing ‘degrowth’ – is the only viable 
option. Although there are important inequality implications of this viewpoint, actual 
implementation of degrowth policies seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Constraints on 
space require us to focus largely on the inequality implications of policies that are more likely 
to be implemented, but for more on these issues see Tim Jackson’s Prosperity Without 
Growth (2011) for an excellent examination of them.    
 
One distinction that should be made is between national and global growth. The argument 
that globally, growth must ultimately run into resource constraints is compelling, though there 
is no agreement on when this might occur. Even those who tend to the more pessimistic end 
of the spectrum on this question, however, do not suggest that poor countries should remain 
poor. Rather, the argument is usually some combination of redistribution from rich to poor 
countries, and zero or negative growth in richer countries to create the ‘ecological space’ for 
poorer countries to grow.10 In principle, these are empirical questions – how much 
‘headroom’ would a transition to a circular economy provide in terms of multiplying the 
potential for finite natural resources to be re-used, and what would this imply for the potential 
trajectory of global growth paths, for example? These questions are rarely posed, however, 
let alone answered, so we really don’t know how much global growth will be possible in the 
future, and therefore what might be required of richer countries to create sufficient ecological 
space for poorer countries to grow and reduce global inequalities to acceptable levels.  
 
                                               
9 We define ‘inclusive’ growth as both broad-based and inequality-reducing. This might be thought of as a ‘hard’, absolute 
definition, where poorer groups should benefit more than others from the process of growth. The alternative, relative definition 
only requires this group to benefit to some degree and is therefore not necessarily inequality-reducing. Indeed, it is unlikely to 
be so. See Spratt, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2013) for a discussion.  
10 See Spratt (2015) for an examination of different perspectives on these questions in the context of competing definitions of 
‘green transformations’.  
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While these key parameters remain unknown – and perhaps unknowable – it is clear that we 
need to move as rapidly as we can in this direction: to make growth as green as possible in 
countries at all levels of income, even if we must ultimately address questions of the 
equitable distribution of finite ecological space. As growth is being ‘greened’, however, we 
need to think hard about how policy can influence its form such that inequalities fall rather 
than rise – i.e. how can it be made ‘win-win’. In Section 3.2 we considered how the design of 
market-based initiatives can influence inequality. It seems likely, however, that the nature of 
growth – in terms of industrial and financial structures, and the way that assets of different 
kinds are distributed across economies, for example – will have a much greater effect.  
 
Whether growth has an inherent tendency to increase inequality is a moot point. As 
discussed previously, the influential Environmental Kuznets Curve proposed exactly this 
relationship for low- and middle-income countries. While the validity of this relationship is 
now seriously disputed – if not discredited – historical experience shows that growth 
certainly can lead to a rapid growth in inequality. This same record also demonstrates, 
however, that there is nothing inevitable about this.  It appears that the dynamic relationship 
between economic growth and inequality is not fixed, suggesting that it can be influenced by 
policy. While ‘green’ growth would have its own peculiarities, there is no reason to assume it 
would be different in this regard, though some specific policy levers may differ. 
 
As well as the design of environmentally specific interventions, therefore, policies to 
influence the broad nature of growth are crucial.  In this regard, we can identify four main 
areas of policy (UNDP 2013). The first category focuses on the ‘inclusiveness’ of growth in 
terms of the quantity and quality of jobs, financial inclusion and macroeconomic stability. To 
be ‘win-win’, green growth should create large numbers of good quality, relatively well-paid 
jobs, provide broad access to affordable financial products, and avoid inequality-increasing 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
The potential for ‘green jobs’ is often used to support the case for green growth. As well as 
creating more jobs than in a business-as-usual scenario, a number of high-profile institutions 
have also claimed that green growth will generate better paid, higher quality jobs (OECD 
2011; UNEP 2011). Others have countered that the idea of green jobs is a ‘myth’ (Hughes 
2011) or that even if jobs are created, this will be at a very high (net) economic cost (Alvarez 
et al. 2010).  
 
Although we don’t know how accurate these predictions are, as the type of ‘green economy’ 
envisaged by its proponents does not yet exist, it is important to assess both direct and 
indirect employment effects. The degree of change required to move economies onto a 
sustainable footing amounts to a ‘green transformation’ (Schmitz 2015), which will inevitably 
have deep structural effects. As well as the creation of ‘green’ jobs in new areas, ‘brown’ 
jobs will be destroyed. Changes to technology, input prices and labour markets will also 
have large macroeconomic effects, influencing employment levels, both generally and by 
sector (Bowen and Kuralbayeva 2015).  
 
The net impact on job creation is inherently uncertain. The same is true for the distribution of 
these jobs, and thus their impact on existing levels of inequality. The creation of more and 
better ‘green’ jobs would certainly be a good thing. Whether this would reduce inequality, 
however, depends on how these jobs are distributed. In both cases, outcomes will be 
strongly influenced by policy.  
 
The second set of policies aims to reduce inequalities of opportunity, particularly access to 
education, health and nutrition. Unequal access to education, and poor health and nutrition 
are both causes and consequences of inequality. Inequality reduces human capital formation 
(Saint-Paul and Verdier 1992; Galor 2011), where people from low-income families are often 
unable to obtain high levels of education, regardless of talent. As a result, they cannot 
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access higher paid jobs, reducing the potential for lifetime earnings (Bottero 2005). Poor 
health also reduces children’s access to education, whilst malnutrition in the early years of 
life can permanently impair cognitive ability: adults affected by malnutrition as children earn 
a fifth less than those who were not (Grantham-McGregor 2007). 
 
The third set of policies address the social exclusion of, and discrimination against, 
marginalised and vulnerable groups. While the implementation and enforcement of anti-
discrimination legislation is an important part of this, so are cultural factors, where the 
education system has an important role (UNDP 2014). 
 
The final group of policies that would shape the inequality effects of green growth relate to 
fiscal policy and redistribution. As discussed previously, there are important interactions 
between environmental taxation and inequality, with net impacts being determined by a 
combination of direct and indirect effects, and the extent of compensating mechanisms. Not 
only does it appear possible to design interventions that are ‘win-win’ from a sustainability–
equality perspective, it may actually be less difficult than is commonly supposed, as the 
regressive impact of environmental taxes may be less pronounced in certain important areas 
than has been assumed.   
 
A broader issue concerns the general tax system, which is likely to have a greater overall 
effect on inequality. Most developing countries have regressive tax systems, largely as they 
disproportionately rely on (regressive) sales taxes rather than (potentially progressive) 
income taxes (Killick 2002). Recent research from Latin America provides empirical support 
for the potential of tax systems to reduce inequality by increasing the weight of income tax in 
the tax system (Martorano 2016). 
 
While growth can increase inequality, the evidence suggests that this is not inevitable. The 
same is very likely to be true of green growth. Inclusive green growth that is inequality-
reducing requires active and strategic policy interventions, however, and this is unlikely to 
emerge naturally. This raises the question of what would make these types of policies more 
likely and more legitimate.  
 
On the first point, agreeing and implementing environmentally positive policies is likely to 
require a degree of social solidarity and commitment to a shared future. The evidence 
suggests that reducing inequalities is important if the conditions for these forms of collective 
action are to be achieved (Olson 1965; Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986; Ostrom 2000). 
 
Legitimacy requires all groups to be able to contribute meaningfully to the policy process, 
and translating this into workable policy requires mechanisms to balance competing 
interests. While beyond the scope of this report to explore in detail, the Mouffian concept of 
re-politicisation (Mouffe 2005) may offer a useful frame through which competing worldviews 
can debate difference and influence policy at a range of levels, including globally (Schmitz 
and Scoones 2015). 
 
This section has identified the following potential relationships with the potential to create 
‘win-win’ interactions between sustainability and inequality: 
 
 Depending on the potential to decouple economic activity from carbon emissions and 
resource constraints, we may ultimately run up against limits to global growth. 
Remaining within these planetary boundaries while addressing human development 
imperatives would require redistribution from richer to poorer countries – as well as 
within these countries – reducing inter- and intra-country inequalities.  
 Nationally, green growth can reduce inequalities through: 
a. the creation of significant numbers of high-quality green jobs, which 
disproportionately benefit the relatively poor; 
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b. avoiding the loss of ‘brown’ jobs disproportionately affecting the relatively 
poor, or compensating/offsetting these impacts; 
c. ensuring access to affordable financial service and avoiding macro instability; 
d. eliminating inequalities of access to education, health and nutrition;  
e. creating a progressive fiscal regime; and 
f. avoiding the social exclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups. 
 Creating legitimate local, national and global political processes – where all groups 
participate effectively in decision-making, and that their interests are balanced – can 
ensure that ‘green transformations’ remain both equitable and green.   
 
As in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, these interactions are far from certain. Whether outcomes do 
indeed turn out to be ‘win-win’ depends on contextual factors such as those described here. 
It is entirely possible that green growth ends up as a ‘lose-lose’ outcome, with negative 
outcomes for both sustainability and inequality. Alternatively, it would be ‘win-lose’, where 
environmental goals are achieved, but inequalities get worse.  
 
In some cases, we don’t know which contextual factors are most important or how far they 
can take us – where the physical and technical limits to ‘green growth’ might lie, for example. 
The implications of this for inter- and intra-country inequality are thus also uncertain, though 
it is certainly possible to think these through under a range of plausible scenarios. Within the 
context of national green growth processes, however, there is a reasonable understanding of 
the most important contextual factors in terms of inequality. The hardest part of achieving 
‘win-wins’ in this regard may be in getting the politics right, such that necessary policies are 
actually implemented, and these are based on legitimate processes.  
 
Thus far we have considered interactions between sustainability and equality. Next, the goal 
of security is introduced, in terms of its interactions with inequality (Section 4) and with 




4 Equality–security interactions 
 
As we shall see, there are important interactions between inequality and security/conflict. 
When considering these, it is particularly important to bear in mind the distinctions between 
vertical and horizontal inequality discussed above. As in Section 3, these will be explored 
according to the three types of interaction: ‘lose-lose’; ‘win-lose’; and ‘win-win’.  
4.1 Lose-lose interactions 
Some of the earliest approaches in the literature to the relationship between inequality and 
conflict can be found in relative deprivation theory, theories of ethnic conflict and structural 
inequality, and the Marxist theory of class struggle and revolution. In each case, the 
assumption is that conflict is fuelled by the grievances among relatively disadvantaged 
individuals or groups.  
 
Empirical evidence to support these hypotheses is weak, however. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), for example, find no cross-national relationship between vertical inequality and 
conflict. What is found in the literature, however, is evidence linking high vertical inequality 
with low levels of trust between citizens (Elgar and Aitken 2011), and altruism and reciprocity 
(Attanasio et al. 2012; Bowles and Gintis 2011). In the light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that high vertical inequality is also associated with low levels of social cooperation (Justino 
2012).  
 
As well as affecting relationships between citizens, high vertical inequality may also reduce 
trust in political institutions because of a lack of opportunities to participate in these 
institutions, and concerns over elite capture. This lack of trust may in turn foster frustration 
and social discontent (Lipsky 1968; Flechtner 2014).  
 
This combination of low trust between citizens and a lack of faith in political institutions may 
also create the conditions for the observed relationship between high vertical inequality and 
an increased propensity of individuals and/or groups to engage in criminal activities and 
violence (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 1998; Gupta 1990). 
 
While there is little evidence linking vertical inequality with formal conflict, the literature 
exploring the relationship between conflict and horizontal inequality is large and growing 
(Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Esteban and Ray 1994; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005; Murshed and Gates 2005). 
 
The strongest evidence links horizontal inequality along ethnic lines with conflict. For 
example, Østby (2004) finds evidence of a relationship between ethnic and regional 
inequalities and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Brown (2010) finds a similar relationship 
between inequality, ethnic identity and violent secessionism, which is supported by the 
results of Cederman et al. (2011).  
 
The evidence suggests that economic and social horizontal inequalities provide the 
conditions that lead to dissatisfaction among the general population and create the potential 
for group mobilisation, but that it is political inequalities that trigger conflict (Brown and 
Stewart 2015).  
 
While the sense of grievance amongst relatively deprived groups is an important part of the 




… [I]t is not only resentment on the part of relatively deprived groups that causes 
political instability. Privileged groups may also attack the less privileged, fearing that 
they may demand more resources, or that they may even try to break away.  
(Østby 2013: 2) 
 
We therefore have a set of clear potential ‘lose-lose’ interactions: high levels of horizontal 
inequality create the conditions for conflicts to occur, while high vertical inequalities 
negatively affect social and political cohesion, increasing the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
 
These potential interactions also run in the other direction: from conflict to inequality. In the 
broadest economic sense, conflict has severe impacts, devastating core economic functions. 
To the extent that whole communities are affected, the effects are amplified, as individuals 
and households are less able to go to their friends and families for help (Justino 2012).  
 
The long-term economic impacts of conflict remain unclear. The ‘phoenix’ view is that 
economies tend to bounce back to their long-run economic trend rate (Organski and Kugler 
1980). Others find a persistent, negative effect on growth (Collier 1999). Whichever is 
correct, these results pertain to the macroeconomic level. The effects of conflict in terms of 
human capital do appear to persist (Justino, op. cit.). To the extent that these affects are felt 
to differing degrees by households and communities – which seems very likely – the 
inequality effects would also persist.  
 
For vertical inequality, the relatively poor may be disproportionately affected by conflict. 
Poorer people may be less likely to be able to educate their children under conflict 
conditions, for example, widening existing inequalities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). There is 
also evidence that this is more likely to be the case with girls than boys (Shemyakina 2011), 
and particular ethnic groups (Østby and Urdal 2014), again worsening with negative 
inequality impacts.  
 
As well as exacerbating existing inequalities, conflicts may also create new ones. Children 
affected by conflict are more likely to be malnourished, for example (Bundervoet and 
Verwimp 2005, cited in Justino 2012). As we have seen, childhood malnutrition is an 
important driver of poverty traps.    
 
In general terms, the impact of conflict on inequalities depends on which households and 
groups are most affected. Where this is the relatively poor, inequalities will be made worse. 
Where elites and the non-poor are disproportionately affected – as seems to have occurred 
in the Rwandan genocide (Akresh and de Walque 2008) – inequality may even fall. Most 
studies, however, find that conflict makes existing horizontal inequalities worse (Justino 
2012).  
 
Inequality tends to be self-perpetuating at both the household and group level. As well as the 
mechanisms discussed above, Justino describes how findings on institutions and group 
dynamics from the economics literature are also relevant for horizontal inequalities in 
conflicts: 
 
The economics literature has shown that institutional effects are responsible for 
poverty traps when political forces and social interactions result in dysfunctional 
institutions that make  property rights insecure and perpetuate inequalities in power 
and wealth (Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff 2006; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006). 
These effects are likely to matter substantially in contexts of civil war due to two 
features that distinguish the impact of armed conflict from other shocks. One is the 
fact that during civil wars property rights are insecure and often cannot be enforced 
because the state has lost the monopoly of violence and the rule of law does not 
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operate. The second is the profound institutional transformation caused by violent 
conflict. 
(Justino 2012: 20) 
 
The following negative interactions have been identified in this section: 
 
 Vertical inequality may reduce trust – both between people in political institutions – 
negatively affecting social cohesion and encouraging crime and antisocial behaviour. 
 Horizontal inequality, particularly between ethnic groups, can increase the likelihood 
of conflict. 
 Conflict may exacerbate existing horizontal and vertical inequalities, and create new 
patterns of inequality. 
 Inequalities tend to be self-perpetuating. 
 
There is quite strong evidence to support these findings. Again, however, the relationships 
are not fully deterministic but contingent. From a research perspective, the interesting 
questions are why, and under what circumstances, do these negative relationships hold.  
4.2 Win-lose interactions 
These types of interaction entail situations where one part of a negative interaction is 
avoided: a ‘lose-lose’ becomes a ‘win-lose’. While this is clearly a second-best outcome 
(compared to a ‘win-win’), it is better than the alternative (‘lose-lose’). An example, as 
introduced above, can be found in the fact that high levels of horizontal economic inequality 
may create the conditions for conflict, but do not inevitably lead to it. Many very unequal 
countries do not suffer from conflict.  
 
In some cases (e.g. Ghana), inclusive political representation seems an important 
counterweight to the tensions created by economic inequality. What seems particularly 
dangerous is a combination of economic and political inequalities – for example, relatively 
poor groups with little or no political voice or representation.  
 
Conflict is likely to erupt in such a situation because the political inequalities motivate 
leaders to mobilize in order to gain power, while the socioeconomic inequalities 
provide potential followers with a powerful grievance. 
(Brown and Stewart 2015: 10) 
 
This suggests that even where significant economic inequality exists between groups, 
tensions that could lead to conflict can be mitigated by increasing political representation. 
Genuinely inclusive political participation may also, over time, lead to a reduction in 
economic inequalities, as policies to facilitate this are more likely to emerge under these 
political conditions.  
 
As well as the combination of political, economic and social dimensions of inequality, 
Stewart (2005) finds that horizontal inequalities are most likely to lead to conflict where: 
 
a. They persist and widen over time; 
b. Group boundaries are relatively impermeable; 
c. There are quite large numbers of people in the different groups; 
d. Aggregate incomes are stagnant, with no absolute improvement in living standards; 
e. Groups are sufficiently cohesive; 
f. Political leaders emerge and are not co-opted into the ruling elite; and 




A number of these criteria are not amenable to policy change – group size, for example. 
Others could potentially be influenced, though this would not be positive – group 
cohesiveness could be undermined, for example. In some cases, however, the potential 
exists for policy to reduce the tensions that could lead to conflict. Positive engagement and 
efforts to reduce inequalities, and policies to raise general living standards, are all things that 
could potentially avoid conflict.  
 
If conflict cannot be avoided, the priority is for it to end as quickly as possible. From an 
inequality perspective, an important task is then to prevent the effects described above. 
Stewart (2005) identifies three policy areas that need to be addressed in post-conflict 
reconstruction to prevent the creation or exacerbation of horizontal inequalities. The first is to 
address economic and social inequalities: 
 
Three types of policies can be adopted to achieve greater group equality in economic 
entitlements (although the distinctions are not watertight). First, policies towards 
changing processes which are either directly or indirectly discriminatory. Secondly, 
assistance can be directed to particular groups, such as training people for interviews 
and subsidising housing. Thirdly, targets and quotas can be introduced for education, 
land distribution, financial and physical assets.  
(Stewart 2005: 11) 
 
The author cautions that the third form of policy has the greatest potential to generate 
resentment and hostility, and may also further entrench existing ethnic divisions. Where 
these are already deep and horizontal inequalities ingrained, however, they may be 
necessary. Stewart (op. cit.) stresses the importance of process reforms, such as those to 
carefully identify and address discrimination, highlighting how important this was in Northern 
Ireland, for example. These types of reforms take time, however, and post-conflict situations 
tend to require immediate change. The second form of intervention is important in this 
respect, as government can directly control public expenditure and make rapid progress in 
this area (ibid.). 
 
The second set of policies addresses political inequalities in areas such as human rights, 
and participation in the political process, including as employees within government. The 
details, in areas such as the best voting arrangements, will depend on the circumstances. 
For example, where the relatively deprived group(s) are a numerical minority (as in Rwanda, 
Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka) is to avoid establishing a UK-style ‘winner takes all’ 
majoritarian political system (ibid.). 
 
The final set of policies are cultural: 
 
Cultural policies can be an important aspect of group grievances and consequently of 
post-conflict policies – such policies aim to correct cultural exclusion and 
discrimination. For example, policies towards language, religious ceremonies, 
religious or ethnic dress, national holidays and so on can trigger or mitigate conflicts. 
Language has been a critical issue in many countries, including Sri Lanka, and 
among the Kurds in Iraq. 
(Stewart 2005: 21) 
 
As discussed above, conflict is more likely to result from horizontal inequalities when they 
exist across a range of dimensions. As well as preventing the growth of inequalities in post-
conflict environments (valuable in its own right), addressing all of these areas is thus likely to 
be crucial in preventing conflicts being reignited. While the importance of each dimension 
may vary, Dimitrijevics (2004) argues that cultural factors have been most important in major 




Despite the strong evidence linking horizontal inequalities to conflict, the incorporation of 
policies to address these in post-conflict settings has been quite limited (Stewart 2005). 
Given conflicts are likely to exacerbate inequalities for the reasons described above, this is a 
crucial area to address.  
 
To summarise, the following potential ‘win-lose’ interactions have been identified: 
 
 Where economic inequalities are high, the probability of conflict can be reduced by: 
a. elite engagement with affected groups; 
b. ensuring political participation; 
c. making efforts to reduce economic inequalities; and 
d. maximising the general growth rate. 
 The inequality-increasing effects of conflict described in Section 4.1. can be mitigated 
in post-conflict settings by implementing policies to reduce: 
a. economic and social inequalities; 
b. political inequalities; and 
c. cultural inequalities. 
 
While not ideal, ‘win-lose’ is better than ‘lose-lose’, particularly where the latter involves 
violent conflicts. It is clear that the ‘wins’ described above are far from inevitable. Indeed, the 
fact that conflicts tend to increase inequalities suggests strongly that, in the absence of 
effective policies to prevent this, the outcome is far more likely to be ‘lose-lose’. Recent 
years have seen significant advances in our understanding of the policies needed to achieve 
this, with the work of Frances Stewart and the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human 
Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) being particularly important. Continuing to expand this 
understanding, while working on the political aspects of implementation is essential.  
4.3 Win-win interactions 
Given that there are strong ‘lose-lose’ interactions in this area, it is not surprising that the 
potential for ‘win-wins’ is also significant. Most fundamentally, avoiding conflicts is likely to be 
positive for inequalities, while reducing inequalities should positively affect the tensions that 
can lead to conflict, erode trust and social cohesion, and encourage crime and antisocial 
behaviour.  
 
As we have seen, horizontal inequalities are important catalysts for conflict. A key part of 
conflict prevention, therefore, is preventing the emergence of such inequalities, particularly in 
a multidimensional sense as described above.11 As we shall see in Section 5 on security and 
sustainability, not all conflicts are the result of inequalities, however, and even where they 
are an important factor, they are rarely the only one (Stewart 2005).  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this report to review the literature on conflict prevention in 
detail, some important elements should be mentioned. Although efforts to prevent conflicts 
have existed since time immemorial, the discipline of conflict prevention is relatively new, 
emerging in the early 1990s but growing rapidly thereafter (Ackermann 2003). Given its 
relative youth, the discipline is still developing a consensus on core concepts, but four main 
questions can be identified (ibid.). 
 
 First, what should be the scope of conflict prevention? Should it address the 
underlying causes of conflict – such as the presence of large inequalities – or focus 
on stopping particular violent events being triggered (Lund 2002)? That is, should 
prevention be ‘light or deep’ (Miall 2000)?  
                                               
11 It is not possible to do more than touch upon the vast, and rapidly developing literature on reducing inequalities in the context 
of this report. Interested readers are referred to ISSC, IDS and UNESCO (2016).  
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 Second, how should theoretical work on the causes of conflict be linked to the 
creation of early warning systems to predict (and potentially prevent) the onset of 
crisis (Ackermann 2003)?  
 Third, once detected, how can looming conflicts be prevented? What, for example, is 
the right balance between turning to a ‘toolbox’ of tried and tested mechanisms (Lund 
1996), or developing a bespoke response to each situation?  
 Finally, how can conflict prevention be ‘mainstreamed’, and built into the procedures 
of global institutions rather than being turned to in extremis (Ackermann 2003)? 
 
These questions are important for inequality. A ‘light’ touch approach, for example, might 
avert a conflagration, but store up greater problems for the future. Over the long term, 
preventing conflicts by addressing ‘deep’ causes is likely to be essential if ‘win-wins’ are to 
be created and maintained.  
 
If conflict cannot be prevented, a final important determinant of whether this outcome is a 
‘win-win’ is the terms of the peace.12 To secure peace it may be necessary to allow 
protagonists to participate in government, for example, providing or maintaining access to 
economic rents, with implications for the distribution of resources and inequality. The deal to 
end the civil war in Sierra Leone, for example, has been criticised on precisely these 
grounds (Francis 2000).  
 
The following potential interactions have been identified in this section: 
 
 Reducing horizontal inequalities should reduce tensions that may lead to conflict. 
 Preventing conflict by suppressing these tensions may store up problems for the 
future, while addressing these underlying issues should create a more stable ‘win-
win’. 
 An equitable peace is more likely to support peace over the longer term. 
 
As we shall see in Section 5, access to natural resources has important interactions with the 
onset, continuation, as well as the end of violent conflicts.  
 
                                               
12 Historically, the most infamous example of this is the Treaty of Versailles, with the draconian terms imposed on the defeated 
German government being seen as a major cause of the Second World War.  
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5 Security–sustainability interactions 
 
Thus far the concept of sustainability has been largely applied to climate change and the use 
of renewable natural resources, such as forests. While these issues remain central to this 
discussion, the focus is extended here to include non-renewable resources. As well as being 
important in its own right from both an environmental and equality perspective,13 there are 
lessons to be learned from the historical interactions between non-renewable resource use 
and conflict. Of particular relevance in this regard is the creation of revenue streams relating 
to renewable resources in the future, and how these might represent a new source of 
‘resource wealth’ or rent.   
5.1 Lose-lose interactions 
 
Since 1990 at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of 
natural resources. In fact, recent research suggests that over the last 60 years at 
least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources. Civil wars 
such as those in Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have centred 
on ‘high-value’ resources like timber, diamonds, gold, minerals and oil. Other 
conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of 
scarce resources such as fertile land and water.  
(Matthew, Brown and Jensen 2009: 2) 
 
It is not inevitable that interactions of this kind must be ‘lose-lose’. In theory, it would be 
possible for different groups to fight over control over a natural resource, with the victor then 
managing the extraction or use of this resource sustainably.14 The historical record does not 
support this view, however. During and after conflicts influenced by control over natural 
resources, these resources have generally been exploited in an unsustainable way, with 
those gaining control extracting as much rent as possible while they retain the ability to do 
so.15  
 
This issue is not restricted to low-income countries. Even before the invasion of Iraq, 
scholars and political commentators were noting that ‘the determination to ensure US access 
to overseas supplies of vital resources... [and] the protection of global resource flows is 
becoming an increasingly prominent feature of the American security policy’ (Brown and 
Stewart 2015: 32).  
 
As well playing an important role in their initiation, conflicts may be perpetuated by incentives 
to control scarce resources, which may be easier in a conflict situation. The role of ‘conflict 
diamonds’ in the civil war in Sierra Leone is often used as an example. In recent years, this 
type of negative interaction has been extended to a wider range of natural resources, and 
connected to the issues of population growth and climate change (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 
1998; Homer-Dixon 2001). 
 
                                               
13 Renewable resource extraction creates significant environmental impacts, and is strongly associated with issues such as 
resettlement and the distribution of resource revenues, both of which are important for inequality.  
14 For renewable natural resources, this would mean the resource was used at a rate compatible with its replacement rate (i.e. 
the maximum sustainable yield). For non-renewable resources, the optimal rate of extraction from an economic perspective is 
that determined by the Hotelling Rule. To be sustainable in the sense that the total stock of capital (natural + human-made) is 
not depleted, revenues should be invested in other forms of capital following Hartwick’s Rule (Spratt 2012).  
15 These phenomena are intimately related to the issue of the ‘resource curse’, where countries with abundant natural 
resources are found to perform worse in terms of growth than those without such resources. For a general review of the 
literature, see Torres, Afonso and Soares (2013). For a review of the political economy issues, see Rosser (2006).  
31 
 
As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues 
to grow, there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify in 
the coming decades. In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for 
water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and 
population distribution may aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts. 
(Matthew et al. 2009: 2) 
 
While there is little current evidence to support the ‘resource wars’ hypothesis with respect to 
climate change,16 this does not mean that this could not become a serious issue in the 
future. As discussed previously, many of the most severe environmental consequences have 
not yet happened. Similarly, the global population continues to expand, and the most recent 
predictions are that this may continue beyond the level previously imagined. Given this, it is 
not surprising that the potential consequences in terms of conflicts over resources have not 
yet materialised.  
 
It can be easy to dismiss warnings in this regard as unduly apocalyptic in tone:  
 
Climate change will degrade or destroy many natural systems, often already under 
stress, on which humans rely for their survival.  Some areas that now support 
agriculture or animal husbandry may become uninhabitable or capable only of 
providing for greatly diminished populations.  Under the pressure of rising 
temperatures and increasingly fierce droughts, the southern fringe of the Sahara 
desert, for example, is now being transformed from grasslands capable of sustaining 
nomadic herders into an empty wasteland, forcing local nomads off their ancestral 
lands. Many existing farmlands in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East will suffer a 
similar fate.  Rivers that once supplied water year-round will run only sporadically or 
dry up altogether, again leaving populations with unpalatable choices.  
(Klare 2015) 
 
While the tone of the quote above is a good example of this kind of doom-laden hyperbole, it 
would be foolish to dismiss warnings of impending ‘resource wars’, not least because of the 
uncertainty over the nature and distribution of impacts.  
 
One type of resource that is considered particularly important in this regard is water. As 
documented in the Pacific Institute’s Water Conflict Chronology, there have been conflicts 
over control of water for thousands of years.17 Today, tensions between countries over 
access to major river systems in Asia and Africa continue, and are likely to intensify as 
population pressures intensify.  
 
In the other direction, there is already evidence of conflict increasing pressure on natural 
resources. In Mozambique’s 1984–92 civil war, for example, the population of Maputo 
increased as displaced peoples moved to the capital. This increased demand for fuelwood 
from the surrounding area, leading to significant deforestation (McGregor 1998). Similar 
effects were seen in Sierra Leone, with a large influx of people into Freetown during the civil 
war. Increased deforestation in surrounding areas has been associated with the increase in 
flash flooding in the city. 
 
Conflicts may also lead to higher levels of poaching, as needs for revenue rises and 
authorities’ ability to prevent poaching falls (De Boer et al. 2000).  More directly, people 
displaced by the Rwandan genocide, as well as fighters involved in the conflict, are believed 
                                               
16 A systematic review of the evidence linking climate change to conflict found no compelling evidence (Theisen, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug 2012). 
17 http://worldwater.org/water-conflict/  
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to have killed elephants and gorillas in the Maiko and Kahuzi-Biega National Parks in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo for food (Van Krunkelsven, Bila-Isia and Draulans 2000). 
 
To summarise, the environment is often a victim of war, adversely affecting those who rely 
on it for their livelihoods: 
 
The environment continues to be the silent victim of armed conflicts worldwide. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has conducted over 20 post-conflict 
assessments since 1999, using state-of-the-art science to determine the 
environmental impacts of war. From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Sudan and the Gaza 
Strip, UNEP has found that armed conflict causes significant harm to the 
environment and the communities that depend on natural resources. Direct and 
indirect environmental damage, coupled with the collapse of institutions, lead to 
environmental risks that can threaten people’s health, livelihoods and security, and 
ultimately undermine post-conflict peace-building.  
(Mrema, Bruch and Diamond 2009) 
 
Here we have a strong link to the previous section on sustainability, and an example of a 
potential ‘lose-lose-lose’ interaction between all three objectives: conflict leads to 
environmental damage, negatively impacting the livelihoods of particular communities, and 
exacerbating existing horizontal inequalities. To the extent that these inequalities exist 
across dimensions and have the characteristics that are likely to foster conflict, a vicious 
circle may be created.  
 
To summarise, the main interaction dynamics identified in this section are: 
 
 Disputes over natural resources can initiate or prolong conflicts in countries. 
 The desire to secure natural resources can initiate conflicts between countries. 
 The victors in conflicts may exploit natural resources in an unsustainable way. 
 Climate change and population growth may lead to conflict through migrations and 
disputes over resources. 
 Conflict can lead to pressure on natural resources through migration effects. 
 The need to fund/support conflict can lead to the unsustainable exploitation of 
resources. 
5.2 Win-lose interactions 
If conflict cannot be avoided, how can environmental damage be minimised? This is partly a 
matter of international law, where a number of legal conventions have been created and 
ratified to prohibit the use of particular weapons. During the Vietnam War, for example, the 
use of Agent Orange led to widespread deforestation and environmental contamination. As a 
result, international legal instruments were created which prohibited ‘widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment’ (Mrema et al. 2009).  
 
A second form of ‘win-lose’ interaction with respect to sustainability and conflict are only 
‘wins’ in the narrowest sense. Ongoing conflicts, and their legacies, may prevent or 
discourage people from exploiting the natural environment in particular areas, for example. 
Cluster bombs or landmines are a particularly insidious form of weapon in this regard, being 
very expensive and time-consuming to remove, but cheap and easy to distribute (Mannion 
2003). Such weapons have a strong indirect environmental impact in that they prevent land 
being used for human activity. What looks like pristine forests in parts of Southeast Asia, 
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such as Lao PDR, may in fact be areas rendered unusable because of the effects of cluster 
bombs dropped during the Vietnam War.18 
 
In a less extreme but general sense, conflict prevents development, which may reduce the 
economic pressures associated with resource use. The relatively limited deforestation in 
Sierra Leone is one example. Again, however, there is no ‘win’ here, even in a narrow 
environmental sense. ‘Sustainable’ resource use means that which is compatible with 
thriving human development. As discussed previously, deforestation rates tend to be higher 
in preservation areas which prohibit development activity, than in those that are preserved 
as a natural part of the livelihoods of traditional communities (Stevens et al. 2014).  
 
A final form of interaction concerns how the ‘lose-lose’ example given at the start of    
Section 5.1 could become a ‘win-lose’.  
 
During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues 
that can ‘make or break’ a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes the sharing 
of natural resources, including minerals, timber, land and water… Natural resources 
can only help strengthen the post-war economy and contribute to economic recovery 
if they are managed well. The international community should be prepared to help 
national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not 
increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. 
(Matthew et al. 2009: 5) 
 
Rather than conflict resulting in victors unsustainably exploiting natural resources, the 
question is: can these resources be shared sustainably and equitably as a means to 
achieving peace? 
 
In this penultimate section, the following ‘win-lose’ interactions have been identified: 
 
 Legal prohibitions on the use of weapons designed to be environmentally destructive 
need to be strengthened and enforced. 
 Incorporating rights to exploit natural resources into peace negotiations may avoid or 
mitigate the inequality-increasing implication of conflicts. 
 
As in the preceding sections, there is no automaticity in these relationships. We already 
have international legal prohibition on acts of war that are deliberately destructive in an 
environmental sense, yet the first Gulf War saw 600 oil wells ignited by the retreating Iraqi 
army, creating an estimated US$85bn in environmental damage (Mrema et al. 2009). 
 
Natural resources can be an important aspect of peace processes, but this certainly does 
not ensure that use rights are equitably distributed. Where there is a need to ‘incentivise’ 
protagonists to cooperate, and power relations are highly unequal, it is perhaps more likely 
that the opposite will occur. Finally, even where natural resource rights are equitably 
distributed, this does not ensure that these resources will be used sustainably. That said, 
given the evidence on the positive environmental impacts of community management of 
natural resources, and the lessons from the resource curse literature on the often extractive 
way that elites can ‘manage’ natural resources, this seems more likely to be the case. 
 
                                               
18 Between 1964 and 1973, the United States dropped over 2 million tonnes of ordnance over Laos. At least 270 million cluster 
bomblets were dropped, a third of which failed to detonate. These have killed or maimed around 50,000 civilians, with 
casualties continuing at rate of 100 a year. Over the past 40 years, less than 1 per cent of the bomblets that failed to detonate 
have been cleared, creating vast no-go areas and severely restraining most forms of economic development in the country 
(Khamvongsa and Russell 2009). 
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5.3 Win-win (+ win?) interactions 
 
Every state needs to use and protect vital natural resources such as forests, water, 
fertile land, energy and biodiversity. Environmental issues can thus serve as an 
effective platform or catalyst for enhancing dialogue, building confidence, exploiting 
shared interests and broadening cooperation between divided groups, as well as 
between states. 
(Matthew et al. 2009: 5) 
 
As in previous sections, the distinction between ‘win-lose’ and ‘win-win’ is a fine one. If done 
well, the use of natural resources has the potential to establish a virtuous circle of peace, 
sustainable resource use, rising prosperity and falling inequalities – a ‘win-win-win’ 
interaction.  
 
Linking equitable and sustainable access to natural resources to peace negotiations in 
conflict-affected countries is a good first step. Addressing environmental issues requires a 
long-term perspective, which is impossible in a conflict environment. Peace is thus a 
prerequisite for sustainability. As discussed previously, reducing inequalities may also be 
necessary to create the conditions for the collective action to resolve environmental issues, 
including the management of common resources. Reducing inequalities may thus be 
necessary for sustainability, and are clearly central for addressing the tensions that may give 
rise to conflicts.  
 
These dynamics appear to be mutually reinforcing, but this is the case in both directions. A 
virtuous circle would be self-reinforcing, but so too would a vicious circle. Understanding the 
most important contextual factors that would encourage the former dynamic and discourage 
the latter is one of the most important development challenges there is.  
 
Whilst these points emerge in the literature from the analysis of national and sub-national 
issues, they may also be relevant at the international level. Creating a fairer long-term 
distribution of natural resources – including the distribution of ‘carbon emission rights’ – 
would build trust between countries and potentially encourage longer term perspectives. At 
the same time, reducing the extreme inequalities between countries may be essential if we 




6 Interaction dynamics, research questions 
and concluding remarks  
 
This report has examined some of the dynamics that underpin interactive relationships 
between sustainability, equality and security, both positively and negatively. These are 
summarised in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.  
 
None of these outcomes are certain, however: all are contingent on other contextual factors. 
While this is true for all of the potential interactions that have been identified, it is also the 
case that the nature of the contextual factors varies considerably from a research 
perspective. In some cases, it is reasonably clear what would need to happen to avoid 
negative interactions or encourage positive ones. In these cases, the outstanding research 
questions relate to issues such as the detail of policy design, how these are affected by 
different locations or sectors, and the political economy of successful policy implementation.  
Table 6.1 Sustainability–equality dynamics 
Lose-lose interactions 
‘Green’ interventions can negatively affect local communities and the environment 
Climate change impacts may exacerbate inequalities, between and within countries 
Damaging environmental activities are often located in areas already affected by other inequalities 
Countries with high vertical inequality (economically and politically) are less likely to have 
environmentally positive policies  
Gender inequality associated with less environmentally positive policies and outcomes 
Win-lose interactions 
Eliminating global income inequality may be incompatible with a sustainable level of emissions 
Reducing inequality in lower-income countries is likely to increase national carbon emissions  
Reducing inequality in lower-income countries is likely to increase natural resource use 
The discovery of natural resource wealth (or creation of new revenue streams from natural 
resources) may exacerbate existing inequalities 
The use of market-based environmental instruments may exacerbate inequalities 
The use of environmental taxes may exacerbate inequalities  
Win-win interactions 
Reducing inequality in middle- and high-income countries is likely to reduce carbon emissions  
Remaining within global planetary boundaries while addressing human development imperatives 
requires redistribution within and between countries, reducing inequalities 
National green growth processes can reduce inequalities through creating ‘green’ jobs, mitigating 
impact of ‘brown’ job loss, ensuring equal access to education and health, preventing discrimination 
and creating a progressive fiscal system  
Legitimate local, national and global political processes can ensure ‘green transformations’ are both 
equitable and green   
 
A good example is the relationship between environmental taxation and inequality described 
in Table 6.1. There is some evidence that these tax instruments tend to have regressive 
effects, but there is also a growing literature examining how these effects can be avoided by 
adjusting other taxes or redistributing some of the proceeds of the tax to poorer groups. 
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Broadly speaking, these types of research question might be described as hypothesis testing 
in nature.  
Table 6.2 Equality–security dynamics 
Lose-lose interactions 
Vertical inequality may reduce trust – both between people in political institutions – negatively 
affecting social cohesion and encouraging crime and antisocial behaviour 
Horizontal inequality, particularly between ethnic groups, can increase the likelihood of conflict 
Conflict may exacerbate horizontal and vertical inequalities, and create new patterns of inequality 
Inequalities tend to be self-perpetuating 
Win-lose interactions 
Where economic inequalities are high, conflict tensions can be reduced by elite engagement, 
ensuring political participation, reducing economic inequalities, and maximising the growth rate 
The inequality-increasing effects of conflict can be mitigated in post-conflict settings by policies to 
reduce economic, social, political and cultural inequalities 
Win-win interactions 
Reducing horizontal inequalities should reduce tensions that may lead to conflict 
Preventing conflict by suppressing these tensions may store up problems for the future, while 
addressing these underlying issues should create a more stable ‘win-win’ 
An equitable peace settlement is more likely to support peace over the longer term 
 
In other cases, the factors which shape whether potentially negative or positive interactions 
actually happen are far less understood. For example, identifying the factors that might 
break – or at least mitigate – the link between carbon emissions and the incomes of people 
in poor countries is a very different type of research question. The type of research required 
here is more about hypothesis formation than testing.   
Table 6.3 Security–sustainability dynamics 
Lose-lose interactions 
Disputes over natural resources can initiate or prolong conflicts in countries 
The desire to secure natural resources can initiate conflicts between countries 
The victors in conflicts may exploit natural resources in an unsustainable way 
Climate change/population growth may lead to conflict through migration and resource disputes  
Conflict can lead to pressure on natural resources through migration effects 
The need to fund/support conflict can lead to the unsustainable exploitation of resources 
Win-lose interactions 
Legal prohibitions on the use of weapons designed to be environmentally destructive need to be 
strengthened and enforced 
Incorporating rights to exploit natural resources into peace negotiations may avoid or mitigate the 
inequality-increasing implication of conflicts 
Win-win interactions 
Peace is prerequisite for sustainability 
The integration of equitable natural resource use into post-conflict development processes can 





As well as the dynamics between pairs of goals, we have also identified important three-way 
interactions, where virtuous or vicious circles are possible. As described in Section 5.3 (and 
the bottom of Table 6.3), there are significant links between conflict, inequality and the extent 
to which natural resources are used sustainably. Given the complexity of these dynamics is 
increased, it may be better to develop focused research questions on particular parts of this 
loop. 
 
The next stage of this research is to derive research questions from the dynamics 
summarised in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. As we have seen throughout this report, all of these 
relationships are contingent on the presence or absence of contextual factors. ‘Lose-lose’ 
dynamics are rarely if ever inevitable, but this is equally true of ‘win-win’ interactions. For 
every example of a negative interaction, a positive alternative from a different time or place, 
where a different set of interventions was used, could be found. The same is true of positive 
interactions.  
 
Sometimes the crucial contextual factors are relatively well understood. In others we know 
very little. In many cases, however, there is partial understanding, but this is contested. That 
is, there are different sets of explanations, or ‘narratives’ which purport to have solutions that 
will allow negative interactions to be avoided and positive synergies created.  
 
As described previously, Schmitz and Scoones (2015) identify four of these narratives from 
the sustainability transitions literature: market-led; technology-led; state-led; and citizen-led. 
This framework can also be applied to the interaction dynamics examined in this report, and 
may be useful in charting a future research agenda.  
 
The first step of this would be to prioritise between the dynamics identified. This may be 
related to their perceived importance to sustainable and secure development, but would also 
reflect the competencies and interests of institutions and individuals. The second step is to 
decide what type of dynamics these are – hypothesis forming or testing – on the basis of the 
existing research evidence. A third step would be to organise this evidence according to the 
different narratives described above, looking for commonalities and points of difference, but 
also taking a normative position in line with the institution concerned.  
 
Finally, the principle research gaps could be identified and a programme of research 
developed to address this. Importantly, the nature of this research should follow directly from 
the nature of the question – i.e. is the task to form plausible hypotheses in the face of deep 
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